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45AN91 199-2-REPORT RECARING RECENT ORE 49-50 DEBACLE

.1. I had a conference with FE/P on 28 September at which I was told that the draft of 49-50 parts by the Staff was from their point of view unacceptable in toto. Through discussion found that the principal reason in the fact that they had an altogether different condept of what the paper was to be about than the one the Staff had been working on. (To see what they thought the paper ought to be, look This document has been approved for release through the HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM OF at the draft estimate they presented originally.) the Central Intelligence Agency: DATE YJANGI HRP 89-2

2. From their conversation, I should judge that the misconception was mainly a con-sequence of the meetings held last summer between FMP and prepesentatives of D/Pub and SS as a result of which they were supposed to take the list of questions submitted and answer those that they could. Apparently, they got the notion that the purpose of these discussions was to provide the exact terms of reference for a paper to be written by them on the subject of Russian-Chinese relations. They seem to have selected the questions from the list that they considered important and used them as a sort of outline for their paper. Thus, for example, when they read the SS draft and found no discussion of the Tito analogy, they were dumbfounded because they had believed that the question regarding Titoism in China (which was one of those in the original list) must be an essential part of the discussion for the reason that they had selected it and used it as part of their at outline.

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I cannot offer a solution for the various problems this case scems to me to arouse, but I am definitely beginning to suspect that it is a mistake to initiate projects on too definite a basis. I know there are those who disagree and believe that the remedy for the situation lies in an extremely careful preliminary consideration of the problem and a statement of it in the most definite terms possible. They may be right, and if I were 1 k ng at the from a purely theoretical angle, Ik should be inclined to think j so too. It seems to me, though, that our actualx experience has tended to indicate the opposite. I think there are probably about three reasons for this: (1) in the case of many estimates --- even those where the general idea is quite clear and many of those that are requested --- you don't really know what you're after until you've gone pretty for into the matter --- often, until you've actually attempted a draft; (2) the existence of a flat, inelastic order for a product tends to inhibit the thinking of those working on it, often making them oblivious to some of the most vital issues involved because they are thinking only in terms of some sort of outline or set of directions; (3) just as sure as you specifiy exactly what you think you want and there is a disagreement about the end product, the people who furnish the product are going to complain with

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heat and bitterness that you have gone back on your promise, changed orders in the middle of the stream and so on, and that the result is confusion, i efficiency, bad faith, poor morale, and general reprehe sibility.

4. I'm inclined to think rather that (1) most Staff projects as possible should be initiated on a purely question-and-answer basis, it be ng made plain to those answering the questions that the exact approach to the project involved will be decided upon by the SS after the answers are in; (2) where a project is to be it written by a Division at the request of the Staff, we should again depend as much as possible on presenting questions to be answered and problems to be solved, not committing ourselves any more than we must to any specific formula for the solution. I know that when you do that, someone always begins wailing to the effect that you

haven't said what you we tod and how can the to expected to proceed until

:
he knows. Such comolaints can always be handled in conferences, however, and the
conferences are usually more fruitful if the initiative comes from those who have
complaned than if you go down to them in the first place and try to tell what you
want.